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Abstract: While the effects of focus have been studied primarily in the context of diversification
across industries, a study of focus within one industry can further our understanding of the
drivers that underlie focus effects. In particular, we study the effects of focus in the mutual fund
industry. We find that funds belonging to more focused fund families outperform similar funds in
more diversified families. Moreover, it is the relatedness among funds within a family, rather
than the mere narrowness of product offering, which is responsible for this positive focus effect.
Total cash inflows into fund families are, however, negatively affected by family focus. Since
focus boosts the return of individual funds but reduces the scale of the total fund family, and
thereby the fees that fund families receive, the interests of fund shareholders and the incentives of
the owners of mutual fund families are potentially in conflict.
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Introduction

The relationship between diversification and the performance of firms has received
ample attention in both the industrial organization and finance literature (e.g., Wernerfelt
and Montgomery 1988, Lang and Stulz 1994). Almost exclusively, however, existing
research has studied firms which diversify across industries. In contrast, we explore the
effect of firm focus within an industry. Thus, we move the discussion and analysis of firm
focus from the corporate to the business unit level. This move allows us to explore
empirically the drivers of a focus effect. Moreover, by restricting the analysis to one
industry, we gain a deeper understanding of how firms operate within this industry,
allowing us to provide richer explanations of our findings.
In particular, we examine the effects of focus within the mutual fund industry over the
period 1985–1996. We explore whether a mutual fund that belongs to a focused fund
family has higher returns than similar funds that belong to more diversified families.
Furthermore, to analyze the drivers of the focus effect, we test whether a mutual fund
(e.g., a conservative corporate bond fund) benefits from belonging to a family which
specializes on that particular type of fund, or whether funds benefit from merely belonging
to a family with a narrow product portfolio, regardless of whether the family specializes
on that particular type of fund or not. In other words, we test whether the focus effect is
driven by relatedness or by narrowness of the product portfolio.
While the relationship between fund performance and family focus is of particular
interest to fund shareholders, the relationship between cash inflows into fund families and
family focus is of interest to the owners of the fund families (i.e., the owners of the
investment management company offering the funds). Therefore, to assess whether the
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interests of fund shareholders and the incentives of fund family owners are aligned with
respect to family focus, we study how cash inflows into families are affected by the focus
of fund families.
The mutual fund industry is particularly attractive for a study of intra-industry focus
effects for three reasons. First, to disentangle the drivers of a focus effect it is essential to
have performance data at the sub-business unit level. In most industries, this data is
difficult to obtain.1 In the mutual fund industry, however, firms are required to disclose
the performance of each individual fund, i.e., each product in the offering of a mutual fund
family. Second, the performance measure is relatively precise in contrast to, for instance,
accounting returns for business units, or quality measures for individual products. Third,
all funds have basically the same access to the main input in this industry, i.e., securities
from which fund managers select their portfolios. Thus, in this setting, focus effects cannot
arise from some firms’ having cornered a part of the input market. Moreover, there are
strong forces at work to make this input market efficient. In sum, the mutual fund industry
is a particularly demanding setting for a test of the effects of focus.
Apart from its virtues as an arena to conduct a focus study, the mutual fund industry
deserves the attention not only of the finance profession, but also of strategy scholars,
industrial organization economists, and policy makers. Following enormous growth over
the past decade, by the end of 1996, the mutual fund industry managed more than $3.5
trillion in assets, making it the second largest financial intermediary in the U.S. behind
commercial banks. By 1996, more than 30 million households had invested in mutual
funds, either through an individual investment account or through a retirement account.
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Thus, understanding the determinants of mutual fund performance and inquiring into
potential agency problems in this industry have become important undertakings.
This paper is organized as follows: Section I briefly reviews the related literature. In
Section II, we describe the organization of mutual fund families and discuss possible
sources of a focus effect in this industry. Section III describes a classification scheme for
mutual funds, and the focus-, performance-, and flow-measures which are used in the
analysis. Section IV reports the relationship between focus and fund performance and
analyzes the drivers of the focus effect. In Section V we explore the relationship between
focus and cash flows into fund families. Section VI concludes.

I. Brief literature review

The literature on diversification is so voluminous that even a brief review would
require an extraordinary amount of space. As a result, the following overview is at best
impressionistic.
Most of the industrial organization literature on diversification analyzes the
relationship between the performance of firms and a general, one-dimensional measure of
diversification. Studies use Herfindahl-like measures (e.g., Montgomery 1985, Scherer and
Ravenscraft 1987), entropy measures (e.g., Palepu 1985), or measures based on a
concentric index introduced by Caves et al. (1980) which takes into account the
relatedness among business units (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). These studies
find either a neutral or a slightly negative relationship between the degree of diversification
and performance (for a survey, see Montgomery 1994).
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Within the industrial organization literature, the study closest in structure to the one
presented in this paper is conducted by Lichtenberg (1992), who tests for the effect of
diversification on plant productivity. Lichtenberg finds that the larger the number of
industries in which a parent firm operates, the lower the productivity of its plants (holding
constant the number of parent-firm plants).
With respect to diversification, the finance literature has analyzed the impact of
acquisition and divestitures on firm performance. For instance, Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1990) find that in the 1980s more bidders in related acquisitions had positive
returns than bidders in unrelated acquisitions. Similarly, Comment and Jarrell (1995) and
John and Ofek (1995) find that divesting unrelated divisions leads to increased
performance, while Daley, Mehotra, and Sivakumar (1997) find that cross-industry
spinoffs create more value than own-industry spinoffs.2
Given these results, it is natural to ask why focus should yield higher returns than
broad diversification. Explanations can be divided into two groups, using as a criterion
whether the proposed benefit accrues only to units the firm is focusing on (but not to
“lone stragglers” within the firm), or whether the benefit accrues to all units. Explanations
of the first kind are based on arguments of “relatedness” whereas explanations of the
second kind are based on arguments of “narrowness.”
Explanations based on relatedness include the following: Montgomery (1985) argues
that broad diversification is associated with low market power in the individual markets in
which a firm operates. Thus, only units on which a firm is focusing (i.e., where a firm has
sufficient market share to exercise market power) should generate higher profitability.

4

A second reason is given by Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), who argue that as
firms employ excess capacity of less-than-perfectly marketable resources (Penrose 1959,
Teece 1982), the marginal return of these resources declines (see also Schmalensee 1985).
Hence, we would expect a negative correlation between the distance of a business unit
from the core of the firm and the profitability of this business unit.
A third explanation emphasizes the fit and complementarities among various choices a
firm makes (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1995; Porter 1996). Focus can enable a firm to
align its activities in a very specific manner, thereby enabling it to generate either a better
product or a product at a lower cost than a less focused firm. Following this line of
reasoning, we will describe in Section II.2 some particular misalignments that can arise
when a mutual fund family attempts to satisfy too many customer demands with respect to
fund types.3
Explanations that are based on the narrowness of a firm’s strategy include Meyer,
Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), who show that a reduction of the number of businesses a
firm is engaged in can reduce influence costs within a firm.4 Using an agency-theoretic
set-up, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) show how the narrowness of business strategies
can facilitate the provision of incentives. These explanations imply that even units within a
firm that do not belong to a group of businesses on which the firm is focusing would still
benefit from the narrowness of the firm’s strategy. By using variables that distinguish
between relatedness and narrowness, we will be able to shed some empirical light on the
impact of these two sources of a focus effect.
In the literature on mutual funds, the effect of focus on fund performance and on cash
inflows into families has not been studied previously. However, we benefit from the
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substantial research analyzing the performance of mutual funds as compared to market
indices in constructing performance measures and identifying relevant control variables
(e.g., Jensen 1968, Blake, Elton, and Gruber 1992, Gruber 1996).
One further study that is related to the present analysis is conducted by Makadok and
Walker (1996). While these authors pursue a very different goal in their paper—to analyze
whether search behavior within a specified stochastic growth system affects fund family
exit in the money market mutual fund industry—they estimate a performance regression
which includes a focus-like variable. In their model, focus is measured by the number of
money market funds a family is offering. They find that fund performance and product
breadth are negatively correlated.
To motivate our choice of variables which measure focus in this industry, the
following section provides a brief description of the organization of mutual fund families
and describes possible sources of a focus effect.

II.1. The organization of mutual fund families

In broad terms, a mutual fund is a company that invests on behalf of individual
investors who share a similar investment goal. Each mutual fund consists of a board of
directors and the capital paid in by fund shareholders (see Figure 1). Formally, the board
of directors hires an investment management company to operate the fund.5 In practice,
however, the investment management company decides to create a new fund, assigns a
fund manager to the fund, and then selects a board of directors to monitor the handling of
the fund’s assets. Throughout the rest of the paper, we will refer to an investment
management company which offers more than one fund as a “mutual fund family.”
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To state it in terms of the diversification literature, the mutual fund family corresponds
to a corporation, the fund managers to business unit presidents, and the shares in
individual funds to the products that the corporation offers.

< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >

The investment management company itself is a publicly or privately held firm. As a
result, fund managers not only have a fiduciary duty vis-à-vis fund shareholders but are
also financially accountable to the owners of the investment management company. Thus,
an agency problem can arise, since the incentives of the fund family owners are not
necessarily congruent with the interests of the fund shareholders. Recent research has
started to explore empirically these potentially divergent interests. For instance, Tufano
and Sevick (1997) find that the composition of the fund board affects the level of fees
investment management companies charge funds for providing their services, while
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that fund managers increase the riskiness of their fund
portfolios in the later months of the year if they have experienced low performance early in
the year.6

II.2. Possible sources of a focus effect

What are potential sources of a focus effect in the mutual fund industry? In particular,
what effects could focus have on fund performance (an internal “production” effect) and
on cash inflows (an external “demand” effect)? We will consider the production effect
first.
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One possible way for family focus to influence fund performance is via the alignment
of investment styles and fund types. The investment and research styles that guide the
selection of securities for a mutual fund portfolio fall into very different categories, e.g.,
fundamental investing and investing using quantitative analysis. While the former involves
in-depth analysis of each individual security the fund manager decides to invest in, the
latter involves strict quantitative, often computerized, screening and analysis of security
prices. Each family acquires a distinctive investment style that permeates the entire
institution.7 For instance, Fidelity is imbued with a fundamental investment style, as it has
been preached and practiced by Edward Johnson II, Fidelity’s owner and CEO, and by
Peter Lynch, Fidelity’s most prominent former fund manager. Each style, in turn, has many
ramifications for how investment analysis is conducted, how performance is evaluated, and
how internal reputations are created.
The investment culture within a fund family can influence the focus-profitability
relationship, because different types of funds can warrant different investment styles. A
family offering a broad array of diverse funds may encounter difficulties either because
investment styles and fund characteristics match poorly, or because the family tries to
accommodate different styles within the same investment management company. For
instance, Fidelity has established itself as a “playground” for equity managers.
Fundamental research is encouraged, and fund managers pride themselves on being able to
find good bargains and to trade quickly in order to earn higher returns than the market. It
was these “gunslingers” who were held in highest esteem within the Fidelity hierarchy. As
a result, Fidelity’s bond fund managers tried to emulate this style. There was, however,
much less room for this kind of investment style in the fixed-income arena, where in
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general low expenses, and not clever security selections, drive returns. The problems
caused by this mismatch climaxed in 1994, when aggressive investing in the U.S. bond
market and moves into risky derivatives and Latin American debt led to huge losses. A
New York Times article covering this incidence concluded: “The Fidelity story also reveals
some dirty little secrets that the mutual fund industry, busy selling Americans on the idea
of one-stop shopping, would rather investors not know: the very things that make a
company good at managing some kinds of investments may make them bad at running
others” (Eaton 1995).
A further example of internal problems generated by frictions between different
investment and research styles comes from a large Canadian mutual fund provider.8 Funds
that invest mainly in blue-chip stocks and funds that invest in small-cap stocks differ
greatly in the amount of additional analysis that a fund manager has to undertake. Bluechip stocks are already under such scrutiny by investment bank- and broker analysts that
often very little additional analysis is required. On the other hand, for small-cap stock
funds, fundamental analysis by the fund managers themselves, which might include road
trips, is needed. In the case of this Canadian mutual fund family, the Director of Canadian
Investments was managing a blue-chip stock fund and oversaw a small-cap stock fund.
She could not understand the high expenses incurred from road trips of the small-cap
stock fund managers and demanded that expenses be cut. As a result, research was
hindered and returns suffered.
In Section IV, we will test for the internal effects of focus by analyzing the relationship
between fund performance and the degree of fund family focus.
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While the internal effect of focus corresponds to returns to specialization in the
“production” of particular types of mutual funds, the external, or demand, effect relates to
possible benefits or detriments of focus in the marketplace. For instance, fund families that
offer only a few categories of funds may have a clear corporate image in the minds of
customers. They stand for particular types of funds, and whenever the need arises for
investors to allocate assets to these types of funds, the investors know where to turn.
Contrary to this, a family which offers a broad variety of funds may attract assets because
investors might find it convenient to use only one fund family for all their investment
needs. Clearly, there exist many factors besides focus that influence the purchase decisions
of investors. As a result, our goal is not to explain consumer behavior. Rather, we explore
whether one possible factor influencing the purchase decision, i.e., focus, has an impact on
the cash inflows into fund families. Moreover, the main reason for studying the
relationship between focus and total inflows into families is to reveal the incentives family
owners face with respect to focus. Since costs of operating funds are fairly fixed and fund
management fees are proportional to assets under management, a main concern of fund
family owners is to increase fund inflows.9

III.1. Different types of funds

As discussed in the previous section, a fund family that focuses on particular fund
categories is able to align its activities and to design its policies and organizational
structure more appropriately than a family which offers a wide variety of funds. Thus, a
useful focus measure can be based on the various types of funds offered by a fund family.10
In general, funds fall into three categories: money market funds, equity funds, and bond
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funds. Since differences in investment styles are particularly acute among and between
bond and equity funds, this study concentrates on these two types of funds.
We employ a classification scheme developed by Morningstar, one of the leading
mutual fund rating agencies, which categorizes funds using the characteristics of the
security portfolio held by the funds. For instance, a domestic equity fund is classified as
“Large Value” if the mean market capitalization of the companies in its portfolio is greater
than $5 billion and the mean price-to-earnings ratio of the portfolio is significantly below
the P/E ratio of the S&P 500. Domestic bond funds are classified along the dimensions of
average maturity and average risk rating (for exact definitions see Appendix 1).
International funds are classified by the countries of which the fund is holding securities,
e.g., “Japan fund.” In total, there are 44 Morningstar categories (see Appendix 2). Please
note that whenever the term “categories” is used in this paper, we are referring to these
Morningstar categories. Since index funds alleviate the problems of misalignments as
described in the previous section, we introduce a further “index fund” category for the
sole purpose of computing focus measures (see next section).11 The performance of an
index fund is still compared, however, to its peers as defined by its Morningstar category.

III.2. Focus, performance, and flow measures

Given the discussion in Section II.2 on internal focus effects, we would expect that
funds which belong to focused families perform better than funds which belong to more
diversified fund families. Moreover, we want to explore whether any potential focus effect
is driven by “relatedness” or by “narrowness.” We would receive evidence for a
relatedness effect if we were to find that funds which belong to categories that a fund
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family is specializing in are performing better than funds which do not belong to such a
category. Likewise, a negative effect of the breadth of product offering on fund
performance would provide evidence of a narrowness effect. In other words, we want to
distinguish between benefits for a fund that arise from being a fund in a family which offers
many similar funds, and benefits for a fund that arise from being a fund in a family that
offers funds in only a few categories (regardless of whether the fund belongs to a category
the family specializes in).
Thus, in the first step, we will test for the effect of focus by analyzing the following
relationship:
“fund performance” = ƒ(“family focus,” other controls)

In the second step, we will attempt to shed light on the sources of a potential focus
effect by exploring the relationship:
“fund performance” = ƒ(“narrowness measure,” “relatedness measure,” other controls)

Lastly, to explore the incentives of fund family owners with respect to focus, we will
analyze the relationship between family focus and cash inflows into fund families:
“flows into fund families” = ƒ(“family focus,” other controls)

In the following paragraphs, we will define more precisely the measures of family focus,
relatedness, narrowness, fund performance, and cash inflows.
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III.2.1. Measures of focus, relatedness, and narrowness

We follow the diversification literature in employing a Herfindahl-like measure as an
indicator of family focus. For family k at time t we define

 assets of family k in category j at time
focuskt = ∑ 
total assets of family k at time t
j 

t



2

where the sum is taken over all categories j of family k at time t.

In our exploration of the sources of the focus effect, we want to include measures of
relatedness and narrowness rather than an overall focus measure. For the relatedness
measure, we construct a variable for each fund that measures the degree to which its fund
family has focused on similar funds. Let fund i be in category j and a member of family k at
time t. Then variable relatedit is defined as: assets of family k in category j at time t,
divided by total assets of family k at time t. One should note that this relatedness measure
is not the same for all funds within a family (unless all the funds happen to be in the same
category). Thus, this measure allows us to differentiate between funds that belong to a
family’s core group(s) and funds that are lone stragglers within a family.
As narrowness-of-strategy measure we use the number of categories a family is
engaged in at time t (variable narrowkt). By including both relatedit and narrowkt in the
later performance regressions, we will be able to distinguish between a narrowness effect
from which all funds within a family benefit, and a relatedness benefit, which accrues only
to funds that belong to a core group of a family.
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III.2.2. Measures of fund performance

Since no single “perfect” performance measure for mutual funds exists—and for the
sake of robustness—we construct four different performance measures. All measures have
as their starting point the total annual return of each fund which includes dividends paid.
In order to make total returns comparable across funds, we adjust total returns to
account for the fact that some funds charge a sales fee (called a “load”).12 We will refer to
these returns as “adjusted total returns.” Morningstar also reports the average returns for
each of its 44 categories. These averages are computed over the entire population
Morningstar tracks (in total over 7,500 funds, comprising essentially all industry
participants).
For the first performance measure used in the analysis, we subtract from each fund’s
adjusted return the mean of its category. The resulting variable is called dcret (difference
from category return).
Second, since the total return is net of expenses charged to the fund, we measure the
“gross return” achieved by a fund’s security portfolio by adding the expense ratio to the
total annual return.13 Subtracting from these gross returns the respective mean category
performance and the mean category expense ratio yields variable dgret (difference in gross
returns).
The third performance measure is based on “Jensen’s alpha,” which is derived from the
standard capital asset pricing model (Jensen 1968). By this measure, the excess return of
fund i in period t is given by:
alphait = (Rit – Rft) – βi(Rmt – Rft)

(1)
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where Rit is the total return of fund i, Rft the risk-free rate (90-day T-Bill), and Rmt the
return of an appropriate market benchmark.
The risk measure βi, in turn, is computed by running for each fund the standard CAPM
regression: 14
(Rit – Rft) = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) (2)
As Elton et al. (1993) point out, the choice of an appropriate market benchmark is
crucial in the computation of Jensen’s alpha (see below). Consequently, rather than
assigning to each equity fund the S&P 500 index as benchmark and to each bond fund a
broad bond index, we assign to each category the index that is used by Morningstar to
benchmark the performance of that particular category (see Appendix 2).
Lastly, the fourth performance variable, malpha, is an excess return measure which
uses monthly performance data obtained from Morningstar’s Principia Plus database.
Whereas in the construction of alpha we implicitly assumed a constant βi over time, we
are now able to relax this assumption. The variable malpha is based on multi-index models
suggested by Gruber (1996), and Blake, Elton, Gruber (1993). To understand the
underlying idea of multi-index models, assume that over a period of time small-cap stocks
outperform large-cap stocks. Then, using a total market index to compute beta would
result in a positive alpha for a fund that held small-cap stocks. The question is, should we
attribute this excess return to the skill of the fund manager, or not? In most cases, the
choice to invest in small-cap stocks was not made by the fund manager, but the manager
was charged to manage a small-cap stock fund. Hence, a more appropriate market
benchmark for judging the manager’s performance is a small-cap index. This is the
rationale for matching funds to different market benchmarks in the computation of alpha
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above. To control for the fact that many funds invest in more than one type of security,
Gruber (1996) suggests to regress the returns of funds on several indices and to compute a
set of relevant betas. More precisely, for domestic equity funds we run the following
regression:15
(Rit – Rft) = αi + β1i(Rmt – Rft) + β2i(Rst – Rlt) + β3i(Rgt – Rvt) + β4i(Rdt – Rft)
(3)
where

Rit = the return of fund i in month t
Rft = the 30-day T-Bill rate in month t
Rmt = the return on the S&P 500 index in month t
Rst = the return on a small-cap portfolio in month t (average return on the Wilshire Small Cap
Index and the Wilshire Small Value Index)
Rlt = the return on a large-cap portfolio in month t (average return on the Wilshire Large Cap
Index and the Wilshire Large Value Index)
Rgt = the return on a growth portfolio in month t (average return on the Wilshire Small Cap,
Mid Cap, and Large Cap Growth Indices)
Rvt = the return on a value portfolio in month t (average return on the Wilshire Small Cap,
Mid Cap, and Large Cap Value Indices)
Rdt = the return on the Lehman Brothers (LB) Aggregate Bond Index in month t

We then compute our new excess return measure as
malphait = (Rit – Rft) – β1i(Rmt – Rft) – β2i(Rst – Rlt) – β3i(Rgt – Rvt) – β4i(Rdt – Rft)

(4)

To take into account that betas might change over time, regression (3) is run using
three years of (rolling) monthly performance data. Thus, to obtain malpha for fund i in
month t, we use the performance of fund i in the 35 months prior to and including month t
to find β1i, … , β4i from (3). These betas are then used in (4) to compute malpha for
month t. Lastly, the malpha’s are annualized over each calendar year.
For domestic bond funds, we employ a six-index model suggested by Blake, Elton,
and Gruber (1993):
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(Rit – Rft) = αi + β1i(Rgt – Rft) + β2i(Rlgt – Rft) + β3i(Rct – Rft)
+ β4i(Rlct – Rft) + β5i(Rmot – Rft) + β6i(Rhyt – Rft)
where

(5)

Rit = the return of fund i in month t
Rft = the 30-day T-Bill rate in month t
Rgt = the return on the LB Intermediate-Term Government Bond Index in month t
Rlgt = the return on the LB Long-Term Government Bond Index in month t
Rct = the return on the LB Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond Index in month t
Rlct = the return on the LB Long-Term Corporate Bond Index in month t
Rmot = the return on the LB Mortgage Backed Bond Index in month t
Rhyt = the return on the First Boston High Yield Bond Index in month t

We then compute our new excess return measure for bond funds as
malphait = (Rit – Rft) – β1i(Rgt – Rft) – β2i(Rlgt – Rft) – β3i(Rct – Rft)
– β4i(Rlct – Rft) – β5i(Rmot – Rft) – β6i(Rhyt – Rft)

(6)

Lastly, we need a measure of cash flows into each fund family. Cash flows at the level
of the fund can be estimated by the difference in fund size after adjusting for appreciation
(or depreciation) of the existing asset stock. Cash flows at the level of the family are then
obtained by summing over all funds within one family:
famflowkt = Σnetassit – (1 + totretit)netassi(t-1)

(7)

where netassit are the total assets of fund i at the end of year t, totretit is the total
return of fund i in year t, and the sum is taken over all funds i within family k.

III.3. Data and methods

Data was collected on all bond and equity funds covered by Morningstar in its
Morningstar Mutual Funds publication as of December 1996. The database consists of a
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growing number of funds, starting in December 1985 with 568 funds and ending in
December 1996 with 1,404 funds offered by 206 families. Out of these 1,404 funds, 962
are equity funds and 442 bond funds. These 1,404 funds held a total of $1,745 billion in
assets which constituted about 77% of all assets in bond and equity funds in 1996. Over
the years, the sample covers 75–94% of all assets in equity funds and 46–75% of all assets
in bond funds. In general, coverage declines over the period of the sample.
To alleviate a possible sample selection bias (see also Section IV.2) and to be able to
distinguish between the relatedness and the narrowness effects, funds are only included in
the analysis if their families offer at least two funds; this reduces the sample slightly, e.g.,
in 1996 to 1,349 funds with $1,718 billion in assets.
Since our data is in the form of a panel, an econometric procedure that utilizes this
structure seems to be warranted. Panel estimation-techniques require more or less
restrictive assumptions on the within-group correlation structure. (In the present case all
observations for each fund correspond to a group.) Let R be the correlation matrix for
modeling the within-group correlation. Let Rt, s denote the t, s element. The technique
employed in the next section imposes as only constraint on the correlation matrix that the
diagonal elements be equal to 1 and the matrix be symmetric, i.e., Rt, s = 1 if t = s, and ρts
otherwise, with ρts = ρst.16 Hence, we take into account possible autocorrelation between
observations over time without having to specify a particular autocorrelation structure
(Liang and Zeger 1986). To further account for possible heteroscedasticity across groups,
we use the Huber (1967), White (1980) robust estimator of variance.
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IV.1. Relationship between performance and focus

In exploring the effect of family focus on fund performance, we will proceed in two
steps. In the first step, following the diversification literature, we will test whether overall
family focus has an impact on fund performance. In the second step, we will analyze
whether it is relatedness or narrowness which drives the focus effect. Studies which have
tested whether funds outperform passive market indices suggest to include variables which
control for differences in (portfolio) turnover, expense ratio, sales loads, and fund size.
Accordingly, we include variables diffturn, which measures the difference between a
fund’s turnover and the average turnover of its category, variable diffexpense, which
measures the difference between a fund’s expense ratio and the average expense ratio of
its category, and variable loaddum, a dummy equal to one if the fund charged a front- or a
back-end load. Since the measures of focus and relatedness both involve non-linear size
terms, we include a fairly flexible size specification in our model to avoid misspecification.
As a result, rather than including, for instance, the logarithm of size, which would force
upon the estimation decreasing (or increasing) returns over the entire range of values, we
include linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of fund- and family size.
Further variables at the level of the fund include the age and the square of the age of
the fund, the market share of the fund within its category, and the standard deviation of its
monthly returns over the year. Given potential sample selection bias in the data (see
discussion in Section IV.2), we would expect a negative coefficient on the linear age term.
The fund’s market share was included, because on one hand a manager with a large share
within a category might receive preferential treatment by industry analysts, while on the
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other hand the manager might find it increasingly more difficult to find attractive
securities.
Further control variables at the level of the family include the sum of assets of the
family within the category and the number of funds of the family within the category (of
the particular fund). Families which have large categories might be able to avoid the
problems of misalignment as discussed in Section II.2.
Lastly, we include the number of funds that exist in the category as a measure of
general competition, for instance, for mis-priced securities.17
Thus, our regression model is specified as follows:
Performance of fund i belonging to family k and category j at time t =
constant
+ α1 focus [t – 1]
+ α 2 diffturnover [t]
+ α 3 diffexpense [t]
+ α 4 loaddum [t]
+ α 5 age [t]
+ α 6 age2 [t]
+ α 7 assets [t – 1]
+ α 8 assets2 [t – 1]
+ α 9 assets3 [t – 1]
+ α 10 fund mshare [t – 1]
+ α11 stdv [t]
+ α 12 family assets [t – 1]
+ α 13 family assets2 [t – 1]
+ α 14 family assets3 [t – 1]
+ α15 family assets in cat [t – 1]
+ α 16 family funds in cat [t – 1]
+ α17 funds in cat [t]

Herfindahl index of family k
(turnover of i) – (mean turnover of category j)
(expense ratio of i) – (mean expense ratio of cat. j)
dummy = 1 when i had a load in 1996
age of fund i
square of fund i’s age
net assets of fund i
squared net assets of fund i
cubed net assets of fund i
market share of fund i in category j
stdv of fund i’s monthly returns over year t
net assets of family k
squared net assets of family k
cubed net assets of family k
sum of assets of family k in category j
number of funds of family k in category j
total number of funds in category j

where [t] means the variable is taken at the end of year t, and [t – 1] that the variable is taken
at the end of year t – 1.
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For results, see Table 1. The dependent variable in regression (1) is dcret, the
difference between the fund’s adjusted total returns and the average adjusted total returns
of its category. In regressions (2) – (4) we use dgret, alpha, and malpha as performance
measures. In all four regressions the (lagged) focus variable is positive and highly
significant. The p-value for the coefficient on the focus variable across the regressions is
0.006, 0.012, 0.027, and 0.002, respectively. The effect is not only statistically significant,
but economically relevant as well. Comparing families at the 20th and 80th percentile of the
focus measure, the coefficients imply a size of the effect of 43, 40, 61, and 59 basis points
per year.

< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >

Due to space constraints and our primary concern with the focus variable, we will
discuss the coefficients of the control variables only briefly. Turnover appears to have a
neutral effect on fund performance, while we find some evidence that higher expenses
decrease performance. The variable diffexpense is negative and strongly significant in
regression (4) and significantly less than one in regression (2). Recall that variable dgret
increases one-to-one with the expense ratio. Thus, a coefficient less than 1 on the
diffexpense variable in regression (2) implies that net performance suffers when expenses
are increased.
For the interpretation of the coefficient on the load dummy, we need to recall that
dcret is adjusted for sales loads, while the other three performance measures are not. The
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general result is that the performance of funds (taking loads into account) is negatively
affected by sales loads.18
The market share of a fund appears to have a negative effect on performance. Using
the coefficient from regression (1) and comparing funds at the 20th and 80th percentile of
fund mshare, the effect is about 25 basis points.
Lastly we note that at least for regressions (3) and (4) there is a negative impact of the
number of funds within the category on fund performance.
Having documented the existence of a focus effect on fund performance, we will now
turn to the question of the sources of this focus effect. Is the focus effect driven by
relatedness or by narrowness? To provide an answer, we will use the above regression
model but replace the focus variable with the related and the narrow variables. Results of
this regression model can be found in Table 2. Again, for the sake of robustness, we use
all four different performance measures as independent variables.

<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>

The measure of relatedness is positive in all four regressions and significant at the 1%
level in regression (3), at the 5% level in regressions (1) and (2), and at the 10% level in
regression (4). In contrast, the measure of narrowness is insignificant in all four
regressions. Thus, the benefit of focus appears to accrue only to funds that belong to a
category of funds the fund family is concentrating on. Mere membership in a focused
family does not generate a performance benefit for a fund.
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What is the magnitude of the relatedness effect? Comparing two funds at the 20th and
80th percentile of related in 1996, the effect is, depending on the performance measure, 30,
27, 62, and 25 basis points per year.
One objection to the results between performance and family focus could involve the
possible reverse direction of causality. Perhaps fund families which have poorly
performing funds start to diversify. There exists some evidence in the finance and
industrial organization literature that poorly performing firms start to diversify broadly
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990, Lang and Stulz 1994) and that low-value mergers are
more likely to be undertaken by firms with poor prospects for increasing their profit
streams from their existing activities (You et al. 1986). To determine whether fund
families which perform poorly start to increase their product portfolio, we construct a new
variable, ∆focuskt, which measures the change in focus of family k between years t and t –
1, and regress it on various past average performance measures of families, controlling for
family size, average fund age, average flows into categories, and average expense levels
(see Section V. for definitions of variables at the family level). For all performance
measures the coefficient on the past performance variable is insignificant, thus throwing
doubt on the reverse-causality explanation in this case (detailed results available from the
author).

IV.2. Sample selection bias

We need to be concerned about the following possible sample selection bias:
Morningstar may cover in its publication only those small families (and funds) which are
successful. Since there exists a negative correlation between focus and family size, the
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focus measure could pick up a size effect caused by the selection bias. Similarly, small
families might be covered less completely than large families. If only hot performing funds
of small families are covered, it could again induce a negative relationship between family
size and performance.
To alleviate this selection bias problem, linear and non-linear terms for both the size of
the fund and the size of the family are included in the performance regressions. An age
variable, which presumably picks up some of the selection bias effect as well, is also
included. Moreover, since lagged variables are used in the regression, the performance in
the first year of each new fund is excluded. Thus, first-year blips in performance, which
could have caused Morningstar to cover a fund, do not influence the results. In addition,
once Morningstar begins to cover a fund, it is not dropped very quickly.
Lastly, we exclude from the analysis all families that have only one fund (in year t).
Clearly, for these funds the focus measure would be equal to 1, yet the inclusion of these
funds could be driven by high past performance. We would potentially detect a very strong
focus effect for these funds (which truly might exist), but which might be overstated since
we do not include all other one-fund families with similarly high focus.
To see whether there exists a strong small family-size or fund-size effect in the data,
we compute the unconditional correlation coefficients between the four performance
variables and family- and fund size. While the correlation coefficients between fund size
and the performance measures are insignificant, the correlation coefficients between family
size and the performance measures are (weakly) significant. However, the correlation is
positive, i.e., the reverse of what we would expect in the presence of a strong sample bias
of the kind described above.19
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V. The impact of focus on cash inflows at the family level

In the last section, we found that funds belonging to families which are focused have
higher returns, ceteris paribus, than funds belonging to broadly diversified families. Given
the intuitive—and empirically validated—positive relationship between past performance
and inflows at the fund level (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Sirri and Tufano 1998) and
the fact that fund families’ payoffs are proportional to fund inflows, the question arises
why are all fund families not highly focused? To answer this question, we should note that
even though owners of fund families care about inflows into individual funds, they are
ultimately concerned with the total flows into all funds they are offering. Thus, to gauge
the incentives of family owners with respect to focus, we need to analyze how focus
affects total inflows into fund families.
With the help of the above-cited studies of the relationship between performance and
inflows at the fund level, we identify several relevant control variables. First of all, we
control for the size of the family. To allow for potential non-linearities we again include
linear, square, and cubic terms of the lagged net assets of the family.20 Second, we control
for the past performance of the funds in each family. For sake of robustness, we employ
several average performance measures. Whenever we average at the family level, we
weight by individual fund asset size. The first performance measure is the average of dcret.
The second performance measure is the average of malpha. A third and fourth
performance measure are the percentile ranks of each fund, where each fund was ranked
within its category using either adjusted total returns or malpha. These ranks were then
averaged over all funds within each family.
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Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), who show that prior performance does not have a
linear effect on cash flows into individual funds, we include in some regressions not a
single family performance measure but rather piecewise ranks as defined by:
average low performancekt = Min(Rankkt , 0.2)
average medium performancekt = Min(0.6, Rankkt – average low performancekt)
average high performancekt = Rankkt – (average low performancekt + average
medium performancekt)
where Rankkt is the asset-weighted average of the percentile ranks of all funds within
family k in year t and ranking for each fund is conducted within the fund’s respective
category using either adjusted total returns or malpha.
These piecewise linear regressors pick up the relationship between flows and past
performance, contingent upon whether the family’s overall performance (as compared to
all other families) fell in the lowest quintile, in the middle 60%, or in the upper quintile. In
other words, these regressors allow us to estimate three different slope parameters for the
past-performance-flow relationship, depending on how well the family performed in the
previous year.
Next, we control for the average age of funds within each family. Again, there might
be a non-linear relationship, because new funds might receive a lot of marketing support
while very old funds have reputation effects which could help increase inflows. We further
control for the expenses charged, by including an average of the variable diffexpense. To
control for a potential dislike of investors for volatility, we include the average of the
funds’ standard deviation of monthly returns.
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We include two further control variables which measure industry-wide effects. We
compute the total flows into each category, and weight the flows for each family by the
percentage of assets that the family has in each category. Thus, we control for sector
flows into particular categories, which may have been en vogue in a particular year.
Secondly, to assess how many competitors the funds of a family face within their
categories, we multiply the number of funds in each category by the percentage of assets
that the family has in each category.
There are possibly other family-specific variables which could influence the total cash
inflows into families, such as the amount spent on advertising. Unfortunately, such data is
difficult to obtain for the 151 families which we track over 13 years. To take into account
family-specific differences, we employ a fixed-effect regression model which controls for
(constant) family differences.
Thus, the regression we run is specified as follows:
Flows into fund family k at time t =
constant
+ α1 focus [t – 1]
+ α2 average performance [t – 1]
{+ α2 average low performance [t – 1]
+ α3 average medium performance [t – 1]
+ α4 average high performance [t – 1] }
+ α5 family assets [t – 1]
+ α6 family assets2 [t – 1]
+ α7 family assets3 [t – 1]
+ α8 average age [t]
+ α9 average age2 [t]
+ α10 average diffexpense [t]
+ α11 average stdv [t – 1]
+ α12 average category flow [t]
+ α13 average funds in cat [t]

Herfindahl index of family k
average performance of funds in family k
for definition see above
for definition see above
for definition see above
net assets of family k
squared net assets of family k
cubed net assets of family k
average of age of all funds in family k
squared average of age
average of diffexpense of all funds in family k
average of stdv of all funds in family k
average of inflows into categories
average of funds in cat
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where we include either a single linear past performance measure or three piece-wise
linear past performance regressors, and all averages are asset-weighted.
For results of the cash flow regressions, see Table 3. Regressions (1) – (6) differ in the
way we control for past performance. In regression (1) the average past performance
measure is based on dcret, in regression (2) the measure is based on malpha, in
regressions (3) and (4) the measures are based on ranking using adjusted total returns, and
in regressions (5) and (6) the measures are based on ranking using malpha.
Across all six regressions we observe a negative and significant effect of family focus
on cash inflows into families. Moreover, the effect is substantial. Comparing two families
with a focus measure one standard deviation apart, regression (1), for instance, suggests
an effect of about $263 million more inflow for the less focused family—a large effect,
given that the mean inflow into families is $478 million. Thus, the owners of fund families
face strong incentives to increase the breadth of their product offering.

<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>

Given the results between individual fund performance and family focus, one may
point out that higher focus leads to better fund performance, which in turn should increase
inflows. To test the size of this indirect effect, we drop the past performance control
variable in regression (7), thereby attributing the positive externality of focus (on flows)
onto the focus measure. As can be seen in Table 3, the coefficient on the focus measure
remains basically unchanged. Thus, at the family level, the indirect negative effect of
diversification on cash inflows via reduced fund performance is only very small.
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Using linear past performance measures, we see a positive, yet insignificant,
relationship between past family-wide performance and consequent cash inflow. The
piece-wise linear regressors allow us to paint a more differentiated picture. Similar to the
findings of Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) at the fund level, we
find that at the family level, performance differences among very poor performing families
do not affect inflows. The surprising result is that among very well performing families
performance differences do not appear to affect inflows either. Only in the intermediate
range do performance differences play a role.
While the sector flows have a significant impact on inflows into families, differences in
expenses, volatility, and number of funds in the category do not affect inflows
significantly. Lastly, families with many young funds appear to gain extra inflows.

VI. Conclusion

This paper set out to analyze the effects of focus in an intra-industry setting. While
benefits of focus have been previously documented at the inter-industry level, the effects
of focus at the intra-industry level have not found much attention. Moreover, we
attempted to disentangle two different drivers of the focus effect: one based on relatedness
and one based on narrowness.
We find that the performance of a mutual fund improves with overall family focus, and
in particular with the fund family’s degree of focus on that fund’s category. Mere
narrowness does not suffice: funds that belong to focused families, yet are lone stragglers,
do not benefit with respect to performance from their membership in a focused family.
Thus, for the internal benefit of focus, relatedness matters. One explanation that is
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consistent with these results, and consistent with field observations, is based upon fit
within a firm’s system of choices. A focused fund family is able to configure its activities,
to design its organizational structure, and to assemble its resources more appropriately
than a family that offers a broad array of different funds.
With respect to inflows into fund families—a measure of particular interest to fund
family owners—we observe a negative effect of focus. The finding that family focus
affects performance positively while reducing total inflows points towards a divergence of
interests between the owners of fund families and fund shareholders. Since higher fund
performance accrues to fund shareholders, shareholders would benefit from focused
families. On the other hand, the owners of fund families, who profit from larger inflows,
have an incentive to broaden a family’s offering. This finding resonates with research
examining the effects of direct marketing charges (12b-1 fees) levied by funds. Fund
managers argue that the additional business generated by advertising yields scale
economies which ultimately benefit the existing fund shareholders. Empirical research,
however, indicates that these charges are a dead-weight cost borne by shareholders, i.e.,
do not benefit existing shareholders (e.g., Ferris and Chance 1987).
In sum, we find that fund shareholders and the owners of fund families may arrive at
opposing answers to the question whether to focus. The results of the performance
regressions indicate that housing different production technologies within the same
organization can be difficult and lead to inferior product output. At the same time, in an
environment in which size confers profitability, and where focus restricts size, focus can be
detrimental from the point of view of the firm’s owners.
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Figure 1: Organization of Mutual Fund Families
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Table 1: The effect of family focus on fund performance
(t-values below coefficients)

performance measure

(1)
dcret

(2)
dgret

(3)
alpha

(4)
malpha

focus

1.356

1.233

1.906

1.841

2.742

2.503

2.216

3.081

0.002

0.002

0.000

0.002

1.855

1.984

0.106

1.667

-0.020

0.774

-0.476

-1.149

-0.089

3.428

-1.200

-4.048

-0.705

-0.062

0.576

-0.115

-4.935

-0.435

2.346

-0.659

-0.030

-0.028

-0.093

-0.108

-1.708

-1.603

-2.785

-6.140

3.528E-04

3.159E-04

8.991E-04

1.267E-03

1.275

1.138

1.876

4.708

-1.356E-04

-1.360E-04

-6.150E-04

-4.001E-04

-1.427

-1.440

-3.762

-3.456

2.750E-08

2.760E-08

5.410E-08

3.910E-08

3.642

3.711

3.527

3.706

-4.950E-13

-4.990E-13

-8.280E-13

-6.140E-13

-4.171

-4.277

-3.282

-3.642

-6.776

-6.741

-2.753

-3.764

-5.457

-5.384

-1.642

-2.920

0.225

0.231

0.340

0.250

2.889

2.915

3.685

3.816

2.540E-05

2.450E-05

3.400E-05

3.080E-05

2.243

2.158

1.666

2.444

-1.170E-10

-1.130E-10

2.690E-11

-2.840E-10

-0.967

-0.937

0.146

-2.135

1.380E-16

1.340E-16

-5.670E-16

6.990E-16

0.421

0.407

-1.216

1.952

-9.250E-07

-6.190E-07

-4.570E-05

-8.640E-06

-0.039

-0.026

-0.933

-0.332

-0.040

-0.044

0.117

0.005

-0.966

-1.076

1.541

0.100

4.235E-04

3.312E-04

-3.444E-03

-2.506E-03

1.308

1.023

-6.577

-6.962

-0.016

-0.031

0.395

0.472

-0.051

-0.099

0.722

1.356

9980
128.17
0.0000

9980
121.44
0.0000

6471
91.10
0.0000

8451
200.37
0.0000

diffturn
diffexpense
loaddum
age
age

2

assets
2

assets

3

assets

fund mshare
stdv
family assets
2

family assets

3

family assets

family assets in cat
family funds in cat
funds in cat
constant
Number of obs.
χ2(14)
Prob. >χ
χ2(14)
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Table 2: The effect of relatedness and narrowness on fund performance
(t-values below coefficients)

performance measure

(1)
dcret

(2)
dgret

(3)
alpha

(4)
malpha

related

1.006

0.918

2.089

0.824

2.309

2.124

2.620

1.667

0.018

0.018

0.038

-0.017

0.989

0.958

1.277

-0.645

0.001

0.002

-3.309E-04

0.002

1.606

1.755

-0.273

1.591

-0.005

0.786

-0.456

-1.094

-0.024

3.480

-1.160

-3.926

-0.673

-0.031

0.611

-0.114

-4.574

-0.212

2.425

-0.631

-0.035

-0.032

-0.095

-0.113

-1.976

-1.844

-2.830

-6.398

4.217E-04

3.791E-04

9.101E-04

1.341E-03

1.521

1.359

1.908

4.962

-1.903E-04

-1.854E-04

-7.475E-04

-4.642E-04

-1.888

-1.845

-4.092

-3.699

3.210E-08

3.180E-08

6.410E-08

4.380E-08

4.041

4.020

3.541

3.771

-5.660E-13

-5.640E-13

-9.750E-13

-6.810E-13

-4.561

-4.564

-3.258

-3.657

-7.042

-6.987

-3.229

-3.739

-5.624

-5.539

-1.860

-2.888

0.2307

0.236

0.334

0.259

2.998

3.017

3.652

3.983

1.380E-05

1.340E-05

2.240E-05

3.110E-05

1.086

1.057

1.028

2.022

-3.060E-11

-3.110E-11

8.870E-11

-2.610E-10

-0.253

-0.258

0.465

-1.856

-5.520E-17

-5.060E-17

-6.780E-16

6.290E-16

-0.170

-0.156

-1.413

1.702

-1.980E-06

-1.460E-06

-4.720E-05

-1.370E-05

-0.081

-0.059

-0.966

-0.511

-0.066

-0.069

0.063

-0.007

-1.513

-1.567

0.791

-0.124

4.294E-04

3.395E-04

-0.003

-0.003

1.310

1.037

-6.594

-7.222

0.217

0.175

0.436

1.147

0.622

0.498

0.815

3.455

9980
119.89
0.0000

9980
104.98
0.0000

6471
90.08
0.0000

8451
191.56
0.0000

narrow
diffturn
diffexpense
loaddum
age
age2
assets
2

assets

3

assets

fund mshare
stdv
family assets
2

family assets

3

family assets

family assets in cat
family funds in cat
funds in cat
constant
Number of obs.
χ2(15)
Prob. >χ
χ2(15)
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Table 3: The effect of focus on cash inflows into families
(t-statistics below coefficients)

(1)
dependent variable for
past
all regressions:
performance
famflow
based on
dcret
-1008.779

focus
average past
performance

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
past perf. past perf. past perf. past perf. past perf.
based on based on based on based on based on
malpha ranking on ranking on ranking on ranking on
adj. total adj. total
malpha
malpha
returns
returns
-991.246 -966.818 -986.613 -963.399 -1075.524

-2.513

-2.466

-2.408

17.871

5.460

463.697

397.294

1.886

0.675

2.034

1.655

average low
performance
average medium
performance
average high
performance
family assets
2

family assets

3

family assets
average age
average age

2

average diffexpense
average stdv
av. category flow
average funds in cat
constant
obs.
R2

-2.399

-2.396

-2.599

-581.134

-1440.007

-0353

-1.299

613.837

812.632

2.027

2.470

-315.948

-2630.046

-0.179

-0/675

(7)
no past
perf.
measure
included
-996.085
-2.479

-0.051

-0.051

-0.050

-0.050

-0.052

-0.053

-0.051

-2.490

-2.501

-2.444

-2.442

-2.554

-2.601

-2.488

2.17E-06

2.17E-06

2.16E-06

2.15E-06

2.18E-06

2.18E-06

2.17E-06

9.714

9.725

9.667

9.656

9.758

9.762

9.724

-6.91E-12 -6.92E-12 -6.88E-12 -6.88E-12 -6.93E-12 -6.92E-12 -6.92E-12
-10.824

-10.837

-10.781

-10.767

-10.859

-10.849

-10.840

-73.772

-73.096

-77.244

-74.201

-89.536

-75.783

-73.171

-1.912

-1.892

-2.000

-1.907

-2.247

-1.851

-1.894

0.734

0.726

0.768

0.712

0.928

0.726

0.727

1.181

1.166

1.235

1.137

1.465

1.119

1.168

-446.580

-461.467

-451.134

-452.275

-463.000

-453.458

-461.245

-1.646

-1.699

-1.663

-1.664

-1.706

-1.672

-1.698

-33.300

-28.852

-43.103

-36.818

-35.818

-30.755

-24.847

-0.876

-0.754

-1.111

-0.924

-0.934

-0.799

-0.657

1235.735

1224.479

1223.369

1229.771

1231.505

1213.881

1223.423

8.603

8.522

8.528

8.514

8.574

8.438

8.517

-0.447

-0.414

-0.447

-0.421

-0.447

-0.426

-0.446

-0.617

-0.570

-0.617

-0.581

-0.617

-0.589

-0.616

1615.365

1590.912

1441.889

1565.017

1632.431

1786.837

1589.659

3.380

3.326

2.985

2.904

3.411

3.664

3.324

1338
0.453

1338
0.453

1338
0.449

1338
0.452

1338
0.431

1338
0.443

1338
0.454

34

Appendix 1: Details on Morningstar categories and risk classification scheme
Equity fund investment style categories:
Investment Style

Median
Market
Capitalization

Value

Blend

Growth

Large-cap
Value

Large-cap
Blend

Large-cap
Growth

Large

Mid-cap
Value

Mid-cap
Blend

Mid-cap
Growth

Medium

Funds are classified as follows:
Let IS = (average P/E ratio of fund / average P/E ratio
of S&P 500) + (average P/book ratio of fund / average
P/book ratio of S&P 500)
If IS < 1.75, the fund is classified as Value.
If IS lies between 1.75 and 2.25, the fund is classified
as Blend.

Small-cap
Value

Small-cap
Blend

Small-cap
Growth

Small

If IS > 2.25, the fund is classified as Growth.

Let MMC = median market capitalization = half of the fund’s assets are invested in stocks of companies
larger than MMC
If MMC < $1 billion, the fund is classified as Small-Cap.
If MMC lies between $1 billion and $5 billion, the fund is classified as Medium-Cap.
If MMC > $5 billion, the fund is classified as Large-Cap.
For international equity funds, IS is defined on the basis of average price/cash flow and average
price/book ratios relative to the MSCI EAFE index. The same cut-off points apply. The vertical axis is
identical.

Bond fund investment style categories:
Investment Style
Shortterm

Intermterm

Longterm

Funds are classified as follows:
Quality

Let AEM = average effective maturity of a fund =
weighted average of all bonds’ maturities, using asset
size as weight.

Short-term Interm-term LongHigh
term High
High
Quality
Quality
Quality

High

Short-term Interm-term Long-term
Medium
Medium
Medium
Quality
Quality
Quality

Medium

If AEM < 4 years, the fund is classified as ShortTerm.

Short-term Interm-term Long-term
Low
Low
Low
Quality
Quality
Quality

Low

If AEM lies between 4 and 10 years, the fund is
classified as Intermediate-Term.
If AEM > 10 years, the fund is classified as
Long-Term.

Funds that have an average credit rating of AAA or AA are classified as High Quality.
Funds that have an average credit rating of A, BB, or BBB are classified as Medium Quality.
Funds that have an average credit rating of less than BBB are classified as Low Quality.
source: Morningstar (1996)
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Appendix 2: Morningstar categories and associated market benchmarks
Morningstar Categories
Convertible Bond
Diversified Emerging Markets
Diversified Pacific Stock
Domestic Hybrid
Europe Stock
Foreign Stock
High Yield Bond
Intermediate-Term Bond
Intermediate-Term Government
International Bond
International Hybrid
Japan Stock
Large Blend
Large Growth
Large Value
Latin America Stock
Long-Term Bond
Long-Term Government
Mid-Cap Blend
Mid-Cap Growth
Mid-Cap Value
Multisector Bond
Muni National Intermediate
Muni National Long-Term
Muni Short Term
Muni Single-State Intermediate
Muni Single-State Long
Pacific ex-Japan Stock
Short-Term Bond
Short-Term Government
Small Blend
Small Growth
Small Value
Specialty-Communications
Specialty-Financial
Specialty-Health Care
Specialty-Natural Resources
Specialty-Precious Metals
Specialty-Real Estate
Specialty-Technology
Specialty-Unaligned
Specialty-Utilities
Ultrashort Bond
World Stock

Market Benchmark
1985 Lehman Bros Agg, 1986-1996 Convertible Bond Index
1985-1988 MSCI Pacific; 1989-1996 MSCI Emerging Markets
Morgan Stanley Country Index (MSCI) Pacific
S&P 500
1985 MSCI World, 1986-1996 MSCI Europe
MSCI EAFE
1985 Lehman Bros Agg, 1986-1996 First Boston High Yield
1985-1988 Lehman Bros Agg, 89-96 Lehman Bros Int Govt/Corp
Lehman Bros Govt
Salomon Brothers World Govt
MSCI World
MSCI Japan
S&P 500
Wilshire LG
Wilshire LV
MSCI Latin America
1985 Lehman Bros Agg, 86-96 Lehman Bros LT Gov/Corp
1985 Lehman Bros Agg, 86-96 Lehman Bros LT Gov/Corp
S&P Midcap 400
Wilshire MG
S&P Midcap 400
1985 Lehman Bros Agg, 1986-1996 First Boston High Yield
Lehman Bros Muni
Lehman Bros Muni
Lehman Bros Muni
Lehman Bros Muni
Lehman Bros Muni
1985-1987 MSCI Pacific; 1988-1996 MSCI FE ex Japan
Lehman Bros 1-3 Govt
Lehman Bros 1-3 Govt
Russell 2000
Russell 2000
Russell 2000
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
S&P 500
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
Wilshire REIT
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
1985 S&P 500, 1986-1996 Wilshire 5000
Wilshire LV
Lehman Bros 1-3 Govt
MSCI World
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Footnotes
1

Within the context of studying inter-industry diversification, some authors have tackled this problem by
analyzing the effects of diversification at the level of business groups which are composed of individual
firms for which data is available (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991).
2

In the strategic management literature, Rumelt (1974, 1982) further explores the relationship between
the type of diversification and firm performance. By adopting categorical measures of diversification,
Rumelt extends the classification of firms beyond one-dimensional diversification measures. He finds that
firms pursuing related diversification perform better than firms pursuing unrelated diversification.
3

Related empirical work, which also uses the logic of complementarities, albeit on much more tightly
defined domains, includes Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997).
4

These authors also show that influence costs are likely to be smaller for firms with related divisions.
Hence, their model includes benefits of relatedness as well.
5

Besides outsourcing the investment function, the fund board also contracts with a custodian, a transfer
agent, and a principal underwriter. The custodian is in charge of physically holding the securities owned
by the fund. The transfer agent is responsible for record-keeping services for fund shareholders, including
distributing dividends and capital gains to fund shareholders. Lastly, the principal underwriter is in
charge of selling the shares of the fund to individuals or institutions. Some investment management
companies provide the record-keeping and underwriting services themselves, while others use third-party
providers for distribution and underwriting.
6

Chevalier and Ellison (1997) further show that the relationship between past performance and cash
inflows is positive and convex. Since cash inflows are tied to compensation, fund managers face in
essence an option. By increasing the variance of returns, fund managers increase the value of this option
while imposing a higher risk on fund shareholders.
7

These culture differences can also make mergers of families difficult. The Wall Street Journal reports:
“Successful fund companies are often products of their managers’ personalities, the organization’s distinct
cultures and other intangibles which may be wiped out in a big merger. These characteristics often color
the companies’ approaches to investing, marketing and dealing with shareholders” (Gasparino 1997).
8

I am grateful to Timothy Duncanson for providing this example.

9

For evidence on the existence of scale economies in the mutual fund industry see, e.g., Baumol et al.
(1990).
10

A measure that is based only on the diversity of funds offered by a family certainly does not capture all
choices a fund family is making. Some of the misalignments described above can be alleviated, for
instance, by outsourcing the investment management for funds that do not fit into the culture of the
family. In general, however, fund families are very reluctant to outsource the most profitable part of their
business. For instance, Fidelity did not outsource the investment management of any fund until June 1997,
when it announced that Bankers Trust would manage Fidelity’s index funds.
11

As a matter of fact, by 1996, only 4.4% of all assets in domestic equity funds and less than 1% of assets
in domestic bond funds were in index funds.
12

Since loads are one-time fees, we need to amortize them over the average time customers hold their
fund shares. In short, we compute average holding times from sales and redemption data available from
the Investment Company Institute’s Mutual Fund Yearbooks for each prospectus objective for each of the
years 1985–1996 and average them over time. Holding times varied from 2.7 years for “Precious Metal”
funds to 10.2 years for “Asset Allocation” funds. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we then adjust the
fund returns by dividing the sales load by the average holding time for its respective prospectus objective
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and subtracting this annualized sales load from the yearly return. A similar adjustment was made for
deferred loads. Further details of the adjustments are available from the author.
13

The annual expense ratio is the percentage of assets deducted for fund expenses, including management
fees, 12b-1 fees, administrative fees and operating costs. It does not include portfolio transaction fees,
brokerage costs, and initial or deferred sales charges.
14

In constructing alphait using equations (3) and (4) it is implicitly assumed that the betas of the funds are
constant from year to year. In a study of all equity funds over the period 1971–1991, Malkiel (1995) finds
“reasonable stability in the betas of mutual funds over time.” Similar results are reported by Ippolito
(1989). Some studies suggest that managers might, however, change the riskiness of the funds
strategically over the course of a year (Brown, Harlow, and Starks 1996, Chevalier and Ellison 1997). To
achieve reliable estimates of βi, funds were only included if they were older than six years.
15

Both the equity- and bond-multi-index models include only U.S. “factors.” As a result, for this
performance variable all international funds are dropped from the analysis.
16

Ordinary least squares would correspond to letting Rt, s = 1 if t = s, and 0 otherwise. A random-effects
model would correspond to letting Rt, s = 1 if t = s, and ρ otherwise; and an AR(1) model would
correspond to letting Rt, s = 1 if t = s, and ρ|t - s| otherwise.
17

For all variables that include category measures, i.e., diffturnover, diffexpense, fund mshare, and funds
in cat, we use category measures as reported by Morningstar. Thus, these measures, e.g., the mean
category expense ratio and the mean category turnover, do not represent sample means, but take into
account virtually all funds that existed in the particular category in the respective year.
18

Even if we concentrate only on the positive loaddum coefficient in regression (3), the result would
imply that given a typical sales load of 5%, the investor would have to hold on to the fund close to 10
years to derive a benefit from the load fund.
19

Another issue which is featured prominently in the literature on absolute fund performance and
performance persistence is survivorship bias (e.g., Brown et al. 1992). Survivorship bias is particularly a
problem for studies that test whether fund managers are able to add value, i.e., whether funds generate
higher than market returns. In this study, however, the effect of the survivorship bias is ambiguous. If the
hypothesis is correct that funds with high values of related perform better than funds with a low measure,
we would expect to have more missing, poorly performing funds that were lone stragglers than funds
which had high values of related. (Brown and Goetzman (1995) show that—not too surprisingly—poorly
performing funds have a greater probability of disappearing than funds with high performance.) Yet, since
more poorly performing funds with low values of related are missing in the data than poorly performing
funds with high values of related, the results are biased against finding a relatedness effect.
Unfortunately, if the hypothesis is incorrect, then we would expect to miss more poorly performing highrelatedness funds than low-relatedness funds, and the results would be biased towards finding a positive
relatedness effect. Given our results, however, this bias would have to be extremely strong, because it
would have to both overpower the true negative effect and generate the observed positive relationship.
20

As a matter of fact, both Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) study the
relationship between past performance and the growth rate of inflows into families, thereby controlling
indirectly for size. Since we are interested in the incentives of family owners and fees are proportional to
asset size, we felt it was more natural to measure flows in net dollars and control for size directly, rather
than assuming a linear relationship between family size and cash flows.
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